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n June 28, 2007, the White House Counsel wrote to notify 
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees that President 
George W. Bush would invoke executive privilege to protect 
documents related to the firing of nine U.S. Attorneys in 2005 
and 2006.1  The letter from the White House Counsel represents 
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1 Documents were subpoenaed from the White House custodian of documents, 
from former Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Political Affairs 
Sara M. Taylor, and from former Counsel to the President Harriet E. Miers.  Letter 
from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, U.S. 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H.R. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, at 1 (June 28, 2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
hearings/pdf/FieldingToConyers070628.pdf [hereinafter Fielding Letter].  The nine 
U.S. Attorneys were David C. Iglesias (District of New Mexico), Daniel Bogden 
(District of Nevada), Paul K. Charlton (District of Arizona), Carol Lam (Southern 
District of California), John McKay (Western District of Washington), Margaret 
Chiara (Western District of Michigan), Kevin Ryan (Northern District of 
California), Todd Graves (Western District of Missouri), and H.E. “Bud” Cummins 
(Eastern District of Arkansas).  See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RESOLUTION 
O 
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the third time since 2001 that President Bush invoked executive 
privilege and the second time his administration has withheld 
documents subpoenaed by a congressional committee.2  Amid 
allegations that the White House has politicized the Justice 
Department, President Bush’s latest invocation of executive 
privilege brings executive-legislative disputes over information 
to the forefront of the American political and judicial landscape.  
Presidents since George Washington have asserted executive 
privilege over information sought by Congress through its 
investigative committees, but resolution through litigation has 
virtually always given way to political brinksmanship.3 
The current conflict between Congress and the President, 
however, represents the first viable opportunity since 1983 for 
the courts to reach the merits of an executive-privilege claim 
between the political branches.4  The D.C. Circuit has already 
 
RECOMMENDING THAT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FIND HARRIET MIERS 
AND JOSHUA BOLTEN, CHIEF OF STAFF, WHITE HOUSE, IN CONTEMPT OF 
CONGRESS FOR REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH SUBPOENAS DULY ISSUED BY THE 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN CONYERS 
AND SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIR SÁNCHEZ, H.R. REP. NO. 110-423, at 22 n.10 (2007), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/MajorityView071105.pdf; see 
also MORTON ROSENBERG, PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: 
HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 24 (Cong. Research 
Serv., RL30319, Apr. 16, 2008). 
2 In the first instance, on December 12, 2001, President Bush ordered Attorney 
General John Ashcroft not to comply with a congressional subpoena for documents 
related to a House Committee on Government Reform investigation of alleged 
corruption in the FBI’s Boston regional office.  H.R. REP. NO. 108-414, at 130 
(2004).  Shortly after the Committee concluded its investigation, the documents 
were released.  Id. at 132–33.  In the second instance, President Bush asserted the 
presidential-communications privilege over pardon documents held by the 
Department of Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney and requested by a 
nonprofit organization under the Freedom of Information Act.  Judicial Watch, Inc. 
v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1109–10 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  The District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals denied the privilege.  Id. at 1110; see also ROSENBERG, 
supra note 1, at 33. 
3 Clashes between Congress and the executive have resulted in litigation only 
three times: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. 
Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983); and United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph 
Co., 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  Of those three cases, only Senate Select 
Committee reached a decision on the merits.  See Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 
730–33. 
4 On March 10, 2008, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives 
filed a civil suit in district court against Harriet Miers and Joshua Bolten demanding 
that they produce documents and testimony concerning the President’s dismissal of 
nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 
MARRIOTT.FMT 12/8/2008  11:09:03 AM 
2008] A Four-Step Inquiry to Guide Judicial Review 261 
circumscribed the scope of the privilege in two contexts: (1) 
where information is requested by the public under the Freedom 
of Information Act (“FOIA”),5 and (2) where information is 
compelled under subpoena in criminal proceedings.6  However, 
courts have avoided defining the scope of the privilege where 
information is requested pursuant to a congressional 
investigation of the President or of an executive agency.  To 
date, the courts have advocated resolution through political 
processes instead.  Recent scholarship has suggested that there is 
no legal foundation for the courts’ hesitation.7  Ultimately, the 
courts have little guidance when faced with a properly postured 
challenge to an executive-privilege claim asserted against 
Congress.  This Comment seeks to aid the courts in tackling the 
tough constitutional separation of powers question by 
recommending a four-step inquiry to guide judicial resolution of 
executive-legislative disputes. 
Using the current controversy as a backdrop, the four Parts of 
this Comment highlight the courts’ hesitation to define the scope 
of the privilege and explore whether existing analytical regimes 
can adequately resolve disputes between Congress and the 
President.  Existing case law does not provide a way for courts to 
address executive-privilege claims in executive-legislative 
 
32–35, Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, No. 1:08-cv-00409 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2008), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ContemptComplaint080310.pdf.  
The complaint was filed after months of negotiations between the committee and 
the White House both before and after the President’s claim of privilege was 
asserted.  See id. at 13–24. 
 The facts underlying United States v. House of Representatives were similar to the 
current controversy.  However, according to the district court, the procedural 
posture of the parties was improper for resolution of the executive-privilege claim 
in that case.  House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. at 152–53.  After the court 
dismissed the Department of Justice’s claim for declaratory relief on procedural 
grounds, the parties reached an agreement and settled the dispute.  See 
ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 9.  Because of the settlement, the court was never 
forced to reach the merits of the executive-privilege claim. 
5 See Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1123–24 (applying 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)).  The 
claim filed by the Judiciary Committee on March 10, 2008, in contrast, is properly 
postured for a resolution on the merits. 
6 See United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 712 n.19 (1974); In re Sealed 
Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
7 David A. O’Neil, The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege, 60 VAND. L. 
REV. 1079, 1083 (2007) (arguing that “what is ‘conventional’ in [judicial review of] 
information disputes is wholly anomalous elsewhere in the law governing executive-
legislative conflict, and . . . no distinction can justify this radically divergent 
treatment”). 
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disputes.  A review of the nine federal cases that give contour to 
the privilege and a comparison of the current dispute to the 
analyses set out therein lead to two conclusions.  First, courts 
have not used executive privilege to draw a line between the 
President’s powers under Article II and Congress’s powers 
under Article I.  Second, judicial review of the President’s 
executive-privilege claim would be proper,8 but the frameworks 
used to analyze the scope of executive privilege in FOIA claims 
and criminal proceedings cannot adequately balance the 
separation-of-powers concerns inherent in interbranch disputes. 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the current 
controversy, including pertinent dates, facts, players, and roles.  
Part II reviews case law, revealing that the courts have avoided 
providing a framework for analyzing executive privilege in 
interbranch disputes, and confirming that the executive-privilege 
claim in the current dispute is justiciable.  Part III allies this 
Comment with recent scholarship and establishes that the courts 
have a proper role as arbiter of interbranch disputes.  Part IV 
then applies the facts of the U.S. Attorney firings to the D.C. 
Circuit’s analyses of executive-privilege claims in criminal 
proceedings and FOIA claims.  In addition, Part IV recognizes 
that applying case law to interbranch disputes would tilt the 
balance of power toward the executive in some cases and 
recommends a four-step inquiry to resolve disputes over 
information between the political branches.  Based on the 
premises that (1) a balancing test is inevitable for judicial 
 
8 Judicial review of the underlying privilege claim would be proper if the 
Department of Justice prosecuted Congress’s contempt charge as is required by 2 
U.S.C. § 194.  See 2 U.S.C. § 194 (2006) (describing the procedure for certification 
of a contempt of Congress charge “to the appropriate United States attorney, 
whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action”).  
While Attorney General Michael Mukasey did name Nora Dannehy, Acting U.S. 
Attorney in Connecticut, as special prosecutor “to continue the inquiry and 
determine whether anyone should be prosecuted,” Eric Lichtblau & Sharon 
Otterman, Special Prosecutor Named in Attorney Firings Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
30, 2008, at A16, the Department of Justice has so far refused to prosecute either 
Miers or Bolten under the statute, stating “‘that the contempt of Congress statute 
was not intended to apply and could not constitutionally be applied to an Executive 
Branch official who asserts the President’s claim of privilege,’” Letter from Michael 
B. Mukasey, Attorney General, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, at 1 (Feb. 29, 2008), available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/ 
hearings/pdf/Mukasey080229.pdf (quoting Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of 
an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 
Op. O.L.C. 101, 102 (1984)). 
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resolution and (2) developing a common law of executive 
privilege is necessary for flexibility, this inquiry provides a road 
map for the courts and explicitly restricts the scope of the 
privilege to the President’s Article II powers. 
I 
NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS ARE FORCED TO RESIGN 
A.  Congressional Investigations Launched amid Allegations 
of Impropriety 
The events precipitating the current dispute between 
Congress and the President over documents and testimony date 
back to 2005 and involve executive-branch staff both inside and 
outside the White House.  Between February 2005 and 
December 2006, the Justice Department considered dismissing 
as many as twenty-six of the ninety-three U.S. Attorneys, but 
only nine were actually asked to resign.9  The circumstances 
surrounding the dismissals were, and remain, unclear.  Both the 
Senate and House Judiciary Committees launched investigations 
in early 2007 into whether the terminations were politically 
motivated.10  In March 2007, then-Attorney General Alberto 
 
9 See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RESOLUTION RECOMMENDING THAT THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FIND HARRIET MIERS AND JOSHUA BOLTEN, 
CHIEF OF STAFF, WHITE HOUSE, IN CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS FOR REFUSAL TO 
COMPLY WITH SUBPOENAS DULY ISSUED BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY, ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN CONYERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE 
CHAIR SÁNCHEZ, H.R. REP. NO. 110-423, at 22 n.10 (2007), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ContemptReport071105.pdf (naming David 
C. Iglesias (District of New Mexico), Daniel Bogden (District of Nevada), Paul K. 
Charlton (District of Arizona), Carol Lam (Southern District of California), John 
McKay (Western District of Washington), Margaret Chiara (Western District of 
Michigan), Kevin Ryan (Northern District of California), Todd Graves (Western 
District of Missouri), and H.E. “Bud” Cummins (Eastern District of Arkansas) as 
the nine dismissed attorneys); see also Memos Suggested DOJ Fire 26 U.S. 
Attorneys, WASH. POST, May 17, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/17/AR2007051700605.html. 
10 Since March 2007, the Senate Judiciary Committee has held seven hearings in a 
series titled “Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice 
Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?”  Those hearings were held on 
February 6, 2007; March 6, 2007; March 29, 2007; May 15, 2007; June 5, 2007; July 
11, 2007; and August 2, 2007.  See generally http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/ 
hearings/hearing-search.cfm (search “Search Hearing Notices” for “preserving 
prosecutorial independence”).  Similarly, since March 2007 the House Judiciary 
Committee and its Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law 
conducted no fewer than nine hearings on the continuing investigation of the 
firings, allegations of selective prosecution, subpoena authorization, and executive 
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Gonzales characterized the controversy as “an overblown 
personnel matter,” saying that the Justice Department “never 
asked a U.S. Attorney to resign in an effort to retaliate against 
him or her or to inappropriately interfere with a public 
corruption case (or any other type of case, for that matter).”11  
Throughout his tenure, Mr. Gonzales maintained that the 
attorneys were dismissed for performance reasons “related to 
policy, priorities and management.”12  Critics in the press, 
however, suggested that the attorneys were fired for precisely 
the reasons Mr. Gonzales denied, and the ensuing public outcry 
set the tone for subsequent hearings in both the House and the 
Senate.  Critics, including some of the dismissed attorneys, 
publicly alleged that the firings were in retribution for either 
failing to prosecute Democratic politicians or for actually 
prosecuting Republican politicians,13 and that the administration 
wanted to make room for U.S. Attorneys who were more 
sympathetic to the President’s political agenda.14  The House 
Judiciary Committee’s investigation supports these allegations.15 
 
branch accountability generally.  Those hearings were held on March 21, 2007; 
March 29, 2007; May 3, 2007; May 10, 2007; May 23, 2007; June 21, 2007; July 12, 
2007; October 11, 2007; and October 23, 2007.  See generally http://www.judiciary 
.house.gov/hearings/legislation.html. 
11 Alberto R. Gonzales, They Lost My Confidence: Attorneys’ Dismissals Were 
Related to Performance, Not to Politics, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2007, at A10. 
12 Id. 
13 See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Amy Goldstein, Voter-Fraud Complaints by GOP 
Drove Dismissals, WASH. POST, May 14, 2007, at A4; Fired U.S. Attorney Alleges 
Political Pressure, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 28, 2007, available at 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/nation/stories/030107dnnatatto
rney.398bb40.html. 
14 See, e.g., David Bowermaster, Charges May Result from Firings, Say Two 
Former U.S. Attorneys, SEATTLE TIMES, May 9, 2007, available at 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003699882_webmckayforum09m 
.html; Jane Ann Morrison, Bush Administration’s Ouster of U.S. Attorneys an 
Insulting Injustice, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Jan. 18, 2007, available at 
http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2007/Jan-18-Thu-2007/news/12044953 
.html. 
15 COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RESOLUTION RECOMMENDING THAT THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FIND HARRIET MIERS AND JOSHUA BOLTEN, 
CHIEF OF STAFF, WHITE HOUSE, IN CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS FOR REFUSAL TO 
COMPLY WITH SUBPOENAS DULY ISSUED BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY, ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN CONYERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE 
CHAIR SÁNCHEZ, H.R. REP. NO. 110-423, at 24 (2007), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ContemptReport071105.pdf (“The 
[c]ommittee’s investigation suggests that U.S. Attorneys may have been placed on 
or removed from the firing list based on their actions in bringing or not bringing 
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In March 2007, House Committee Chairman John Conyers, 
Jr., and Chairwoman Linda Sánchez of the Subcommittee on 
Commercial and Administrative Law initiated a series of 
hearings “focus[ed] on testimony with respect to actions of 
present and former Department of Justice (“DOJ”) officials and 
employees as well as DOJ documents relat[ed] to the matter.”16  
At a hearing on March 20, 2007, the subcommittee authorized 
Chairman Conyers to issue subpoenas “for current and former 
White House and Justice Department officials Karl Rove, 
Harriet Miers, William Kelley, Scott Jennings and Kyle 
Sampson, as well as documents that the [c]ommittee [had] not 
yet received. . . . [S]pecifically, unredacted documents that [had] 
not previously been provided.”17  During three months of 
subsequent negotiations with the White House, the committee 
also authorized a subpoena and sought a judicial order of limited 
immunity for former Justice Department liaison to the White 
House Monica Goodling.18  The committee also subpoenaed 
documents and electronic information from Attorney General 
Gonzales.19  In the letter accompanying the subpoena to the 
attorney general, Chairman Conyers recounted the two sides’ 
unsuccessful efforts to reconcile their respective positions, noting 
specifically that the committee had been “patient” and “sought 
to accommodate” Attorney General Gonzales’s concerns 
regarding the sensitive nature of certain requested materials.20  
However, the letter included firm language refusing to accept 
 
politically sensitive prosecutions.  In other cases, it seems relatively clear that 
Republican complaints about the enforcement decisions made by some U.S. 
Attorneys in controversial vote fraud cases may also have led to their being placed 
on or removed from the list.”).  While both the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees have been conducting interviews and investigating the firings, this 
Comment will focus on the efforts of the House Committee because it is closer to 
litigation. 
16 ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 24. 
17 Press Release, H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Judiciary Subcommittee 
Authorizes Chairman Conyers to Issue Subpoenas in US Attorney Investigation 
(Mar. 20, 2007). 
18 See Press Release, H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, House Judiciary Committee 
Approves Immunity Order, Authorizes Subpoena for Former DoJ Official Monica 
Goodling (Apr. 25, 2007). 
19 See Letter from John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States, at 1 (Apr. 10, 2007), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/AGSubpoena070410.pdf. 
20 Id. at 1. 
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“the [d]epartment’s unilateral judgment as to how much of [the] 
information it needs to disclose, or its unilateral judgment as to 
whether limited viewing of certain information [on terms set out 
by the Justice Department] is sufficient to permit effective and 
efficient review.”21  Thus, the committee subpoenaed a broad 
spectrum of documents.22 
B.  The Justice Department Reacts to Congressional Subpoenas: 
The Clement Letter 
It was not until June 13, 2007, that Chairman Conyers 
subpoenaed White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten, as 
custodian of White House documents,23 and former White 
 
21 Id. at 2 (“Recent developments, including the apparent inconsistencies 
between your statements and the testimony of your former chief of staff, Kyle 
Sampson, declarations that your former senior counsel and White House liaison, 
Monica Goodling, intends to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination rather than answer the Subcommittee’s questions, and a series of 
recent resignations by senior officials at the [d]epartment, including Mr. Sampson 
and Ms. Goodling, have only increased my conviction that the Subcommittee must 
have all potentially relevant information that it has requested without further delay.  
Under these circumstances, you must understand why we cannot accept the 
[d]epartment’s unilateral judgment as to how much of this information it needs to 
disclose, or its unilateral judgment as to whether limited viewing of certain 
information, on [d]epartment premises and under [d]epartment supervision, and 
with no copying or note-taking permitted, is sufficient to permit effective and 
efficient review.”). 
22 Id. at 6–7.  The subpoenaed documents included “[c]omplete and unredacted 
versions, including complete paper and electronic versions, of any and all” (1) 
“documents created by or sent to anyone at the [d]epartment, referring or 
otherwise relating in any way” to the firing of the former U.S. Attorneys; (2) 
“documents referring to or otherwise relating in any way to a communication 
between anyone at the [d]epartment and any [m]ember of Congress concerning any 
of the terminated U.S. Attorneys”; (3) “documents that anyone at the [d]epartment 
submitted to, or that refer or otherwise relate in any way to a communication” 
between anyone at the department and any of the terminated attorneys “concerning 
any failure in performance, including any failure to comply with [d]epartment 
priorities and directives”; and (4) “documents previously requested in writing by the 
[s]ubcommittee that the [d]epartment has withheld, in whole or in part, from 
production on any basis or for any reason, including . . . those documents ‘generated 
within the [e]xecutive [b]ranch for the purpose of responding to the congressional 
(and media) inquiries about the resignations.’” 
23 Subpoena from John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, to 
Joshua Bolten, White House Chief of Staff (June 13, 2007), available at http:// 
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/BoltenSubpoena070613.pdf. 
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House Counsel Harriet Miers24 for documents and testimony.  
These subpoenas, issued simultaneously with the Senate 
committee’s subpoena to Sara Taylor, former Deputy Assistant 
to the President and Director of Political Affairs,25 precipitated 
the President’s suggestion two weeks later that he would assert 
executive privilege if the dispute was not resolved.  After the 
committees issued the subpoenas and the Justice Department’s 
Office of Legal Counsel reviewed the responsive documents, 
Paul Clement, Solicitor General and Acting Attorney General, 
notified President Bush that “the documents fall within the 
scope of executive privilege” and that “Congress’s interest in the 
documents and related testimony would not be sufficient to 
override an executive-privilege claim.”26  In support of this 
assertion, Mr. Clement discussed separately the three categories 
of documents requested: (1) “documents and testimony 
consist[ing] of internal White House communications,” (2) 
“communications between White House officials and individuals 
outside the Executive Branch,” and (3) “communications 
between the Department of Justice and the White House.”27 
Mr. Clement made several arguments regarding internal 
White House communications.  First, deliberations between 
White House officials about the wisdom of dismissing and 
replacing U.S. Attorneys, specific individuals who could be 
removed, potential replacements, and possible responses to 
inquiries about the dismissals all “fall squarely within the scope 
of executive privilege.”28  Second, Congress’s oversight authority 
arguably does not extend to the President’s constitutionally 
vested power to nominate and remove U.S. Attorneys, and, even 
if it does, the Judiciary Committees have not demonstrated that 
their interest in the subpoenaed materials outweighs the 
 
24 Subpoena from John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, to 
Harriet Miers (June 13, 2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/ 
pdf/MiersSubpoena070613.pdf. 
25 See Fielding Letter, supra note 1, at 1. 
26 Letter from Paul D. Clement, Solicitor General and Acting Attorney General 
of the United States, to George W. Bush, President of the United States, at 1 (June 
27, 2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Clement070627.pdf 
[hereinafter Clement Letter]. 
27 See id. at 2, 5, 6. 
28 Id. at 2. 
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presumptive nature of the privilege.29  Third, the committees’ 
need for the information has been “sharply reduced” by the 
volume of documents and the number of interviews the Justice 
Department provided in the preceding months.30  Finally, Mr. 
Clement challenged the assertion that the committees were 
entitled to internal White House documents simply because 
Justice Department officials had provided “written 
misstatements” and “false statements” to committee 
investigators in preceding months.  Ultimately, the Justice 
Department provided all documents related to statements by 
department officials that were challenged for their veracity, 
meeting the committees’ “legitimate oversight interests.”31 
Mr. Clement wrote that communications between White 
House officials and individuals outside the executive branch are 
within the scope of executive privilege.  In addition, Mr. 
Clement argued that presidential aides must, at times, solicit 
information from outside the executive branch, and “the 
President’s ability to obtain such information often depends on 
the provider’s understanding that his frank and candid views will 
remain confidential.”32  Thus, the mere fact that the advice 
comes from individuals outside the executive branch does not 
eviscerate the President’s confidentiality interests.  Further, the 
committees may not overcome the presumptive nature of an 
executive-privilege claim where they offer no compelling reason 
why the communications are essential to the fulfillment of the 
committees’ functions. 
Mr. Clement divided his discussion of documents and 
testimony related to communications between the White House 
and the Justice Department into three subcategories: (1) White 
House-department communications that had not been disclosed 
to the committees, (2) White House-department 
communications that had been disclosed to the committees, and 
(3) testimony from current or former White House officials 
about previously disclosed communications.33  The President has 
 
29 Id. at 2–3.  The Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in United States v. Nixon 
held that the presumptive nature of the privilege is founded on “a [p]resident’s 
generalized interest in confidentiality.”  Nixon I, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974). 
30 Clement Letter, supra note 26, at 3. 
31 Id. at 4. 
32 Id. at 5. 
33 Id. at 6. 
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a “powerful” interest in protecting undisclosed communications 
between the White House and the Justice Department, Mr. 
Clement asserted, “particularly given Congress’s lack of 
legislative authority over the nomination or replacement of U.S. 
Attorneys.”34  Moreover, Mr. Clement described the 
committees’ need for previously disclosed communications as 
“weak.”35  The fact that the White House provided documents 
and information to Congress “does not constitute a waiver and 
does not preclude the President from asserting executive 
privilege with respect to White House materials or testimony 
concerning such communications.”36  The process of mutual 
accommodation would be undermined by a system where the 
President was not able to assert a privilege over information and 
testimony solely because the documents were provided in a 
good-faith effort to resolve a dispute.  Finally, “investigating the 
replacement of U.S. Attorneys clearly falls outside [Congress’s] 
core constitutional responsibilities,” and any legitimate interest 
Congress may have in testimony from current or former White 
House officials was already satisfied by the department’s 
“extraordinary accommodation.”37 
C.  The White House Responds to the Subpoenas: 
The Fielding Letter 
On June 28, 2007, the day after the White House received Mr. 
Clement’s letter, Fred Fielding, Counsel to the President, issued 
a joint letter to Chairman Conyers and Senate Judiciary 
Committee Chairman Leahy, stating that “the President is 
satisfied that the testimony sought from Sara Taylor and Harriet 
Miers is subject to a valid claim of [e]xecutive [p]rivilege and is 
prepared to assert the [p]rivilege with respect to that testimony if 
the matter cannot be resolved.”38  The Fielding Letter affirms 
the legal conclusions set out in the Clement Letter and 
establishes the White House’s position: 
[F]or the Presidency to operate consistent with the 
Constitution’s design, Presidents must be able to depend upon 
 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 7. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Fielding Letter, supra note 1, at 3. 
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their advisors and other [e]xecutive [b]ranch officials speaking 
candidly and without inhibition while deliberating and working 
to advise the President.  The doctrine of [e]xecutive [p]rivilege 
exists, at least in part, to protect such communications from 
compelled disclosure to Congress, especially where, as here, 
the President’s interests in maintaining confidentiality far 
outweigh Congress’s interests in obtaining deliberative White 
House communications.39 
The letter concludes that “there is no demonstration that the 
documents and information [the committees] seek by subpoena 
are critically important to any legislative initiatives that [the 
committees] may be pursuing or intending to pursue.”40  By 
affirming Mr. Clement’s analysis, the Fielding Letter signaled 
that the coordinate branches had reached an impasse. 
D.  The Judiciary Committee Pursues Contempt Charges 
On June 29, 2007, Chairmen Leahy and Conyers responded to 
both the Clement and Fielding letters by accusing the White 
House of “Nixonian stonewalling” and reliance on “a blanket 
executive-privilege claim”41 that “belies any good faith attempt 
to determine where privilege truly does and does not apply.”42  
The committees also demanded a privilege log outlining the 
legal and factual bases for the President’s executive-privilege 
claim for each document withheld.43  On July 9, the deadline for 
receipt, the White House refused to comply.44  The White House 
Counsel reasserted that access to the documents was not critical 
to Congress’s ability to fulfill its duties and stated that Congress 
lacked authority to demand a privilege log from the President.45  
The same day, Ms. Miers informed Chairman Conyers that, 
pursuant to letters received from White House counsel, she 
 
39 Id. at 2. 
40 Id. at 2–3. 
41 Letter from Patrick Leahy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
and John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Fred Fielding, 
Counsel to the President, at 1 (June 29, 2007), available at http://judiciary 
.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Conyers-Leahy070629.pdf. 
42 Id. at 2. 
43 Id. at 3. 
44 See Letter from Fred Fielding, Counsel to the President, to Patrick Leahy, 
Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, 
H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, at 2 (July 9, 2007), available at http://judiciary 
.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Fielding070709.pdf. 
45 Id. 
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would neither produce documents nor testify before the 
committee.46  Subcommittee Chairwoman Sánchez rejected both 
Ms. Miers’s47 and Mr. Bolten’s48 claims of privilege on July 12 
and July 19, respectively.  On July 25, the full committee issued a 
report recommending that the House of Representatives 
approve contempt of Congress citations against the two,49 and 
the report was presented to the full House for consideration on 
November 5, 2007.50 
E.  The Contempt Report 
In their additional views submitted with the contempt report, 
Chairman Conyers and subcommittee Chairwoman Sánchez 
asserted that the information subpoenaed from the White House 
is essential for the committee to (1) conduct meaningful 
oversight and (2) consider modifying or enacting federal laws to 
curb future wrongdoing.51  Mr. Conyers and Ms. Sánchez went 
 
46 Letter from George T. Manning, Counsel for Harriet Miers, to John Conyers, 
Jr., Chairman, H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, and Lamar Smith, Ranking Member, 
at 1 (July 9, 2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ 
Manning070709.pdf (“I must inform you that in light of the President’s assertion of 
[e]xecutive [p]rivilege, Ms. Miers cannot provide the documents and testimony that 
the [c]ommittee seeks.”).  The following day, Miers announced that she would not 
appear for the hearing at all.  ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 26; see also Michael 
Roston, BREAKING: Bush Blocks Miers from Appearing Before House Judiciary 
Committee, Contempt Charges Possible, RAW STORY, July 11, 2007, 
http://rawstory.com/news/2007/BREAKING__Bush_blocks_Miers_from_0711.html. 
47 See ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 27. 
48 See Thomas Ferraro, Bush Chief of Staff Faces Possible Contempt Charge, 
REUTERS, July 20, 2007, http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-
28568320070720. 
49 Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, House Panel Backs Citing Bush Aides for Contempt, 
WASH. POST, July 26, 2007, at A3. 
50 See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RESOLUTION RECOMMENDING THAT THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FIND HARRIET MIERS AND JOSHUA BOLTEN, 
CHIEF OF STAFF, WHITE HOUSE, IN CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS FOR REFUSAL TO 
COMPLY WITH SUBPOENAS DULY ISSUED BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. NO. 110-423 (2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
hearings/pdf/ContemptReport071105.pdf. 
51 See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RESOLUTION RECOMMENDING THAT THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FIND HARRIET MIERS AND JOSHUA BOLTEN, 
CHIEF OF STAFF, WHITE HOUSE, IN CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS FOR REFUSAL TO 
COMPLY WITH SUBPOENAS DULY ISSUED BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY, ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN CONYERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE 
CHAIR SÁNCHEZ, H.R. REP. NO. 110-423, at 54–60 (2007), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/MajorityView071105.pdf (relying on the 
Supreme Court’s rulings in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“The 
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on to reject Ms. Miers’s and Mr. Bolten’s claims of executive 
privilege for four reasons.  First, the privilege was not properly 
asserted because “there has been no signed or personal 
statement from the President himself asserting the privilege.”52  
Second, neither Ms. Miers nor Mr. Bolten provided a privilege 
log describing the documents withheld “as directed by the 
subpoenas” and as “the courts have required.”53  Third, as to Ms. 
Miers’s claim, “neither the White House nor Ms. Miers . . . 
demonstrated that the presidential communications executive 
privilege even applies in this case.”54  As a private party at the 
time of the hearing, Ms. Miers should not be able to rely on a 
third party’s assertion of privilege to justify the refusal to 
produce documents or testimony.55  Fourth, refuting claims set 
out in the Clement and Fielding letters, Mr. Conyers and Ms. 
Sánchez argued that even if the subpoenaed information 
properly falls under executive privilege and the privilege was 
properly invoked, “any such privilege is outweighed by the 
compelling need for the House to have access to this 
information.”56  In defense of this argument, Mr. Conyers and 
Ms. Sánchez cited the committee’s responsibility to investigate 
executive wrongdoing.57 
F.  The House of Representatives Sues to Enforce Contempt 
Charges Against Miers and Bolten 
On February 14, 2008, the House of Representatives voted to 
hold Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten in contempt of Congress for 
failure to testify and produce documents in the Judiciary 
 
power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative 
process.  That power is broad.  It encompasses inquiries concerning the 
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.  It 
includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the 
purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.  It comprehends probes into 
departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or 
waste.”), and McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (“[T]he power of 
inquiry–with process to enforce it–is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the 
legislative function.”)). 
52 Id. at 68. 
53 Id. at 69. 
54 Id. 
55 See id. at 71. 
56 Id. at 70. 
57 See id. at 70–71 & nn.320–23. 
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Committee’s investigation.58  Before Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten, 
no White House official had ever been cited for contempt.  
Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 194,59 the Justice Department should have 
referred the charges to the U.S. Attorney for the District of 
Columbia for commencement of a grand jury investigation.  
However, as anticipated,60 the Justice Department refused.  In a 
letter to the Speaker of the House on February 29, Attorney 
General Michael Mukasey said that he would not prosecute Mr. 
Bolten or Ms. Miers because their refusal to comply with the 
committees’ subpoenas “did not constitute a crime.”61  Ten days 
later, in response to the Justice Department’s failure to act, the 
House of Representatives filed a civil suit in district court to 
enforce the subpoenas.62  This was unprecedented.  It was the 
only time that Congress has sued to enforce compulsory process 
against a member of the White House staff.  Existing case law 
provides little guidance about how the courts will resolve the 
dispute because of the unique status and posture of the parties. 
II 
BACKGROUND: EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE CASE LAW 
To date, executive-privilege claims have been litigated in four 
contexts: (1) cases arising from subpoenas in criminal 
investigations, (2) a president’s affirmative challenge to a federal 
 
58 The House approved Resolution 982, H.R. Res. 982, 110th Cong. (2008) 
(enacted), which provides for the adoption of Resolution 979, H.R. Res. 979, 110th 
Cong. (2008) (enacted), recommending that the House of Representatives find 
Harriet Miers and Joshua Bolten in contempt of Congress for refusal to comply 
with subpoenas issued by the Judiciary Committee, and adoption of Resolution 980, 
H.R. Res. 980, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted), authorizing the Judiciary Committee 
to initiate or intervene in judicial proceedings to enforce certain subpoenas.  See 
also Paul Kane, West Wing Aides Cited for Contempt: Refusal to Testify Prompts 
House Action, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2008, at A4; Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Current 
Legislation: Upholding the Constitution, http://www.speaker.gov/legislation?id 
=0159 (last visited June 6, 2008). 
59 The statute describes the procedure for certification of contempt of Congress 
charge “to the appropriate United States attorney, whose duty it shall be to bring 
the matter before the grand jury for its action.”  2 U.S.C. § 194 (2005). 
60 See Ari Shapiro, All Things Considered: Bush Aides in Contempt; Will They Be 
Prosecuted? (National Public Radio broadcast July 25, 2007), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12234115. 
61 Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney General, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker 
of the House of Representatives, at 2 (Feb. 29, 2008), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Mukasey080229.pdf. 
62 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 4. 
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statute, (3) requests for information under FOIA, and (4) cases 
arising from subpoenas in congressional investigations of the 
executive branch.  This Part organizes the landscape of 
executive-privilege cases according to these four circumstances 
to highlight two points.63  First, the Supreme Court and the D.C. 
Circuit have gone to great lengths to eschew proposing an 
analytical framework for the scope of executive privilege in 
interbranch disputes.  Avoiding the issue has left Congress and 
the President free from constraint in their negotiations over the 
release of information.  However, avoiding the issue has also left 
scant precedent to aid courts in resolving the aftermath of a 
breakdown in those negotiations.  Second, the House has 
standing in the District Court for the District of Columbia for 
judicial review of an interbranch executive-privilege question. 
A.  Cases Arising from Subpoenas in Criminal Investigations 
The bulk of the executive-privilege doctrine has arisen from 
claims asserted to thwart criminal investigations of the executive 
branch.  Presidents have resisted subpoenas from trial courts, 
special prosecutors, and grand juries in active or pending 
litigation to prevent the release of documents and testimony 
related to alleged criminal conduct.  Cases involving former 
President Nixon are the most well-known.64  While all four 
 
63 Some may argue that a chronological approach to analyzing the development 
of the executive-privilege doctrine is more logical because it provides the reader a 
better understanding of how each holding either draws on or builds upon those that 
preceded it.  Because the universe of executive-privilege case law is so small, and 
the privilege is “bottomed on a recognition of the unique role of the President[,]” 
the premise that each case bears on the others regardless of the source of the 
information request seems logically sound.  Espy, 121 F.3d 729, 752 (D.C. Cir. 
1997).  However, a categorical approach better highlights the courts’ hesitance to 
adjudicate disputes in the executive-legislative context.  While it seems logical to 
assume that the courts will continue to refer to their prior reasoning, both the 
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have disavowed any implication that the logic 
used to dispose of cases in other contexts can be extrapolated to conflicts between 
the President and Congress. 
64 Between 1972 and 1974, multiple investigations were launched to determine 
the extent of President Nixon’s involvement in illegal activities carried out by his 
staff and those loyal to him.  Tape recordings of conversations made by President 
Nixon in the White House revealed that he obstructed justice and attempted to 
cover up the June 17, 1972, break-in at the Democratic National Committee 
headquarters at the Watergate hotel complex.  Discovery of those tape recordings 
led to four lawsuits and precipitated Nixon’s eventual resignation from office on 
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Watergate cases were linked to recorded conversations between 
President Nixon and other members of the executive branch, 
only two were litigated pursuant to claims of executive privilege 
in ongoing criminal investigations: Nixon v. Sirica65 and United 
States v. Nixon (Nixon I).66 
1.  The Nixon Cases 
Sirica and Nixon I define the broad contours of executive 
privilege relating to criminal proceedings.  In Sirica, the D.C. 
Circuit addressed the Special Prosecutor’s petition for an order 
to show cause when neither President Nixon nor any 
subordinate official would produce certain tape recordings in 
compliance with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum.67  The court 
relied on established and venerable precedent to reject President 
Nixon’s claim that executive privilege is an absolute privilege.68  
While the tapes under subpoena from the Special Prosecutor 
were “presumptively privileged,”69 the “application of 
[e]xecutive privilege depends on a weighing of the public interest 
protected by the privilege against the public interests that would 
be served by disclosure in a particular case.”70  The court 
balanced the public interests and determined that “the public 
interest in confidentiality must fail in the face of the uniquely 
powerful showing made” in support of disclosure.71  The 
characteristics of the Special Prosecutor’s “uniquely powerful 
 
August 9, 1974.  See generally Howard Ball, “We have a Duty”: The Supreme Court 
and the Watergate Tapes Litigation (Contributions in Legal Studies) (1990). 
65 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
66 Nixon I, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).  The other two cases, Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974), and Nixon 
v. Administrator of General Services (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425 (1977), had different 
origins and will be discussed later. 
67 Sirica, 487 F.2d at 704–06.  A subpoena duces tecum is a court order requiring 
named parties to appear and produce tangible evidence (e.g., documents, books) for 
use at a trial or hearing. 
68 Id. at 714 (quoting Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 
788, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“Any claim to executive absolutism cannot override the 
duty of the court to assure that an official has not exceeded his charter or flouted 
the legislative will.”), and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) 
(“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is.”)). 
69 Id. at 717. 
70 Id. at 716. 
71 Id. at 717. 
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showing”72 went undefined and the Supreme Court did not 
subsequently adopt that language. 
Nine months after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Sirica, the 
Supreme Court laid the cornerstone of federal jurisprudence on 
executive privilege with its unanimous decision in Nixon I.  
There, President Nixon asserted executive privilege to deny 
production of documents and tape recordings subpoenaed by the 
Watergate Special Prosecutor.73  The Court responded with 
several key holdings in rejecting President Nixon’s assertion.  
First, the Court established that executive privilege derives from 
“the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of 
constitutional duties.”74  The privilege was therefore 
“fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably 
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”75  
Second, the Court held that although presidential 
communications are presumptively privileged,76 the privilege is 
qualified and not absolute: “neither the doctrine of separation of 
powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level 
communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, 
unqualified [p]residential privilege of immunity from judicial 
process under all circumstances.”77 
While these two central holdings paralleled the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in Sirica, the Supreme Court went on to address the 
scope of executive privilege in criminal proceedings more 
thoroughly.  Specifically, the Court explained that “great 
deference” should be given to a President’s need to receive 
candid, objective advice from advisers in the course of exercising 
his Article II powers.78  However, 
[t]o read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an 
absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to 
enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a 
generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of 
nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the 
 
72 Id. 
73 See Nixon I, 418 U.S. 683, 688 (1974). 
74 Id. at 705. 
75 Id. at 708. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 706. 
78 Id. 
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constitutional balance of “a workable government” and 
gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.
79
 
The judiciary’s ability to conduct their own constitutionally 
designated function provided the foundation for the Court’s 
decision that the tapes must be released.  Seeking to resolve the 
“competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential 
functions of each branch,”80 the Court balanced the need for 
release of the information with the President’s need for 
confidentiality–a balancing test similar to that undertaken by 
the court in Sirica.  While a “President’s acknowledged need for 
confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in 
nature,” the “constitutional need” for relevant evidence in a 
particular criminal trial is “specific and central to [its] fair 
adjudication.”81 
2.  In re Sealed Case (Espy) 
Following the Watergate scandal, executive privilege was 
rarely invoked in criminal investigations82 and it took more than 
twenty years for another presidential assertion of the privilege in 
this context.  In 1997, the D.C. Circuit began to address lingering 
questions about the scope of executive privilege in the criminal 
context when it decided In re Sealed Case, commonly known as 
Espy.83  The Espy decision stands as the most significant 
discussion of executive privilege since Nixon I, and the D.C. 
Circuit relied upon and further developed its holding in 
subsequent FOIA litigation.84 
In Espy, the appeals court addressed President Clinton’s 
assertions of executive and deliberative process privilege over 
eighty-four documents related to Agriculture Secretary Mike 
Espy’s resignation in 1994.  In the course of a grand jury 
investigation into Mr. Espy’s alleged improprieties, the grand 
jury issued a subpoena duces tecum seeking documents from the 
 
79 Id. at 707. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 712–13. 
82 In two prosecutions arising out of the Iran-Contra investigation, the courts 
noted that the subpoenas implicated executive privilege but did not reach the issue.  
See United States v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (D.D.C. 1989); United States v. 
North, 713 F. Supp. 1448 (D.D.C. 1989). 
83 Espy, 121 F.3d 729. 
84 See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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Office of Independent Counsel that were “‘accumulated for, 
relating in any way to, or considered in any fashion, by those 
persons who were consulted and/or contributed directly or 
indirectly to all drafts and/or versions’ of the White House 
Counsel’s report” for the President on the allegations against 
Espy.85  Importantly, it was undisputed that none of the 
documents was actually viewed by the President.  The case 
brought issues to the foreground that were left unresolved by the 
Nixon cases, including (1) “the precise parameters of the 
presidential executive privilege,” (2) “how far down the chain of 
command the privilege reaches,” (3) “what showing is necessary 
to overcome a valid claim of privilege,” and (4) “whether the 
President has to have seen or had knowledge of the existence of 
the documents for which he claims privilege.”86 
The court first addressed the scope of the privilege by making 
a careful distinction between the presidential-communications 
privilege and the deliberative-process privilege.87  It explained 
that, “[a]lthough executive privilege in general is no stranger to 
the courtroom, one form of the executive privilege is invoked 
only rarely and that is the privilege to preserve the 
confidentiality of presidential communications.”88  The court 
followed Nixon I, reiterating that there is “a presumptive 
privilege for [p]residential communications founded on a 
President’s generalized interest in confidentiality”89 and added 
that the privilege should apply only to “direct decisionmaking by 
 
85 Espy, 121 F.3d at 735. 
86 ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 17. 
87  While the presidential communications privilege and the deliberative 
process privilege are closely affiliated, the two privileges are distinct and have 
different scopes.  Both are executive privileges designed to protect executive 
branch decisionmaking, but [the deliberative process privilege] applies to 
decisionmaking of executive officials generally, [and the presidential 
communications privilege applies] specifically to decisionmaking of the 
President.  The presidential privilege is rooted in constitutional separation of 
powers principles and the President’s unique constitutional role; the 
deliberative process privilege is primarily a common law privilege.  
Consequently, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential 
communications privilege is subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the 
deliberative privilege. 
Espy, 121 F.3d at 745 (citation omitted). 
88 Id. at 738. 
89 Id. at 743 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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the President.”90  Within that scope, however, the privilege 
applies to “documents in their entirety, and covers final and 
post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones.”91 
Second, the court established how far from the President 
executive privilege may extend.  Noting that the language used 
in Nixon I to describe the scope of the privilege vacillated 
between broad and narrow, the court explained that the public 
interest is best served by extending the presidential-
communications privilege to “communications made by 
presidential advisers in [the] course of preparing advice for [the] 
President . . . even when these communications are not made 
directly to [the] President.”92  The court also held that 
communications “authored [by]” as well as those “solicited and 
received [from others]” by either a presidential adviser or an 
adviser’s staff “who have broad and significant responsibility for 
investigating and formulating the advice to be given the 
President” should be protected by the privilege.93  The court 
recognized the risk to open government of “expanding to a large 
swath of the executive branch a privilege that is bottomed on a 
recognition of the unique role of the President” and carefully 
delineated its boundaries.94  Specifically, the court held that “the 
privilege should not extend to staff outside the White House in 
executive branch agencies”95 because only communications 
within the bounds of the White House “are close enough to the 
President to be revelatory of his deliberations or to pose a risk to 
the candor of his advisers.”96 
After the court’s decision in Espy, uncertainty remained 
because “[t]he appeals court’s limitation of the presidential 
communications privilege to ‘direct decisionmaking by the 
President’ makes it imperative to identify the type of 
decisionmaking to which it refers.”97  Further, the parameters of 
the privilege are confined “to those Article II functions that are 
identifiable as ‘quintessential and non-delegable,’” including the 
 
90 Id. at 752. 
91 Id. at 745. 





97 ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 19. 
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appointment and removal power that was under scrutiny in 
Espy, “the commander-in-chief power, the sole authority to 
receive ambassadors . . . , the power to negotiate treaties, and 
the power to grant pardons and reprieves.”98  Thus, “[t]he 
limiting safeguard is that the privilege will apply in those 
instances where the Constitution provides that the President 
alone must make a decision,” but “decisionmaking vested by 
statute in the President or agency heads . . . would not 
necessarily be covered.”99 
Turning next to the “focused demonstration of need,”100 the 
court held that the standard for a party seeking to overcome the 
privilege has two components.  First, each group of subpoenaed 
materials must “likely contain[] important evidence.”101  Second, 
the evidence contained in the subpoenaed materials must “not 
[be] available with due diligence elsewhere.”102  Such a 
demonstration of need is necessary “even when there are 
allegations of misconduct by high-level officials.”103  Finally, by 
holding that the Office of Independent Counsel had 
demonstrated sufficient need to overcome the presidential-
communications privilege, the court implicitly held that the 
President did not have to see the documents under subpoena to 
assert privilege over them. 
B.  Presidential Affirmative Challenge of a Federal Statute 
The second context for executive-privilege litigation arose 
during the Watergate scandal when President Nixon demanded 
changes to the statute governing presidential records.  Nixon v. 
General Services Administration (Nixon II)104 is unique because 
it is the only time the privilege has been used as an offensive tool 
to initiate litigation to protect a president’s interests.  On the 
surface, Nixon II reinforces the Court’s holding in Nixon I, but it 
also provides substantive language for the development of the 
four-step inquiry set out in Part IV, infra. 
 
98 Id. at 19–20. 
99 Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
100 Espy, 121 F.3d at 746. 
101 Id. at 754. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 746. 
104 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
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In Nixon II, President Nixon challenged the constitutionality 
of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act 
(“PRMPA”).105  The statute required that all recordings and 
papers produced during Nixon’s presidency be released for 
archival scrutiny.106  Nixon argued, inter alia, that releasing any 
of the materials without his consent would violate the 
“generalized Presidential privilege [that] survive[d] the 
termination of the President-adviser relationship” when he left 
office.107  In dismissing President Nixon’s privilege claim against 
the executive branch, the Supreme Court invoked Nixon I, 
noting that the privilege is qualified and not absolute, that it 
derives from the separation of powers, and that the public 
interest in releasing the documents should be balanced against 
the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of the 
President’s decision-making process.108  The Court went on to 
hold that PRMPA can achieve its purpose through archiving 
while effectively preserving executive confidentiality: “[a]n 
absolute barrier to all outside disclosure is not practically or 
constitutionally necessary.”109  Finally, the Court considered the 
weight of public interest decisive in upholding the statute against 
a claim of privilege, finding that Congress might use tapes and 
papers in exercising its “broad investigative power[s]” to “aid 
the legislative process.”110  Specifically, the Court found it 
important to broadcast the events leading up to President 
 
105 Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, 
88 Stat. 1695 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006)). 
106 Id. at § 101 (“[A]ny Federal employee in possession shall deliver, and the 
Archivist of the United States . . . shall receive, obtain, or retain, complete 
possession and control of all original tape recordings of conversations which were 
recorded or caused to be recorded by any officer or employee of the Federal 
Government and which–(1) involve former President Richard M. Nixon or other 
individuals who, at the time of the conversation, were employed by the Federal 
Government; (2) were recorded in the White House or in the office of the President 
in the Executive Office Buildings located in Washington, District of Columbia; 
Camp David, Maryland; Key Biscayne, Florida; or San Clemente, California; and 
(3) were recorded during the period beginning January 20, 1969, and ending August 
9, 1974.”). 
107 Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 440. 
108 See id. at 446–47. 
109 Id. at 450. 
110 Id. at 453. 
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Nixon’s resignation so Congress could “gauge the necessity for 
remedial legislation.”111 
Thus, Nixon II represents a solidification of the public interest 
balancing test that the Supreme Court set out in Nixon I and that 
the D.C. Circuit later elaborated upon in Espy.  However, Nixon 
II also included language that is important to discussions in Parts 
III and IV, infra, about whether judicial review of executive-
legislative disputes is proper and whether the courts have a role 
in arbitrating those disputes.  Further, the Court in Nixon II 
subtly inserted itself as the “fulcrum between executive and 
legislative power.”112  The Court reasoned that, 
[i]n determining whether [PRMPA] disrupts the proper 
balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry 
focuses on the extent to which [the Act] prevents the 
[e]xecutive [b]ranch from accomplishing its constitutionally 
assigned functions.  Only where the potential for disruption is 
present must we then determine whether that impact is 
justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within 
the constitutional authority of Congress.
113
 
Thus, the Court asserted itself as the proper venue for 
determining whether presidential secrecy outweighs Congress’s 
powers to legislate and conduct investigations.114 
C.  Public Requests for Information Under the Freedom 
of Information Act 
The third context for executive-privilege litigation arose in 
2004, and the D.C. Circuit’s opinion represents the culmination 
of judicial thought on the subject.  Judicial Watch, Inc. v. 
Department of Justice115 involved a public-interest judicial-
watchdog organization that sought documents under FOIA 
related to former President Clinton’s pardon requests.  In its 
 
111 Id. 
112 O’Neil, supra note 7, at 1105. 
113 Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 443 (citations omitted). 
114 See also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173–74 (1927) (recognizing 
Congress’s power to subpoena witnesses and documents: “[T]he two houses of 
Congress . . . possess not only such powers as are expressly granted to them by the 
Constitution, but such auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to make 
the express powers effective. . . . We are of opinion that the power of inquiry–with 
process to enforce it–is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative 
function.”). 
115 365 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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decision, the appeals court adopted much of its reasoning from 
Espy and further expounded on the parameters of executive 
privilege.  Just as Espy resolved questions left unanswered by 
Nixon I, the D.C. Circuit addressed additional unresolved issues 
in Judicial Watch.  Like the appointment and removal power at 
issue in Espy, Judicial Watch involved a core, nondelegable 
presidential function–the pardon power.  When applying the 
Espy analysis the court was faced with a new question: whether 
the proper boundaries of executive privilege should be defined 
by the organization of the executive branch or by the functional 
roles of executive officials.  Ultimately, the appeals court 
determined that an organizational test better comports with the 
Court’s analysis in Nixon I.116 
In 2004, Judicial Watch, Inc., challenged an extension of the 
presidential-communications privilege beyond the walls of the 
White House to internal Department of Justice documents.117  In 
its original request, Judicial Watch sought release of “[a]ny 
and/or all [p]ardon [g]rants by former President Clinton in 
January 2001, and [a]ny and/or all pardon applications 
considered” by the former president.118  The Justice Department 
invoked the presidential-communications privilege to protect 
4341 documents119 under FOIA Exemption 5, which protects 
“inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which 
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in 
litigation with the agency.”120  The Department of Justice argued 
that because “the Pardon Attorney’s ‘sole’ responsibility was to 
advise the President on pardon applications. . . . [he] is, in effect, 
a White House adviser,” and the presidential-communications 
privilege should apply to all pardon-related documents produced 
by him, regardless of his function within the hierarchy of the 
Justice Department.121  Further, the Justice Department argued 
 
116 See id. at 1123–24. 
117 Id. at 1110. 
118 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
119 See id.  Judicial Watch argued that the privilege had not been properly 
invoked because an executive department does not have a right to assert it.  
However, because Judicial Watch did not raise the argument in the district court, it 
was not preserved for appeal.  Id. at 1114 (“[T]he issue of whether a [p]resident 
must personally invoke the privilege remains an open question and the court need 
not decide it now.”) (citation omitted). 
120 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006). 
121 Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1112. 
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that documents prepared pursuant to the President’s exercise of 
a “quintessential and non-delegable” power, like the pardon 
power, should be protected under the penumbra of executive 
privilege regardless of the functional role of the executive 
official producing the documents and regardless of whether the 
documents were solicited and received by White House advisers 
as required under Espy.122 
The appeals court disagreed, noting that “[f]urther extension 
of the privilege to internal Justice Department documents that 
never make their way to the Office of the President on the basis 
that the documents were created for the sole purpose of advising 
the president on a non-delegable duty [would be] unprecedented 
and unwarranted.”123  Also, the court parroted Espy, holding 
that “the presidential communications privilege applies only to 
those pardon documents ‘solicited and received’ by the President 
or his immediate White House advisers who have ‘broad and 
significant responsibility for investigating and formulating the 
advice to be given the President.’”124  The court held that while a 
bright-line rule mandating application of the privilege to all 
documents created in the process of providing pardon advice to 
the President would be easier to implement, “such a bright-line 
rule is inconsistent with the nature and principles of the 
presidential communications privilege, as well as the goal of best 
serving the public interest.”125  Indeed, the court saw 
“fundamental conceptual difficulties” with a test based on the 
functional role of executive officers.126 
While recommendations about who should be pardoned may 
be relayed from the pardon attorney127 to the President through 
 
122 Id. at 1119. 
123 Id. at 1116–17. 
124 Id. at 1114 (quoting Espy, 121 F.3d 729, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). 
125 Id. at 1117; see also id. at 1119 (“Extension of the presidential communications 
privilege beyond the limits of [Espy] to all documents prepared or received by the 
Pardon Attorney or his Office simply because they are produced for the sole 
function of assisting the Deputy Attorney General in presenting pardon 
recommendations for the President would have far-reaching implications for the 
entire executive branch that would seriously impede the operation and scope of 
FOIA.”). 
126 Id. at 1122. 
127 The Office of the Pardon Attorney within the Department of Justice assists 
the President in exercising his clemency power.  Clemency requests for federal 
criminal offenses are submitted to the Office of the Pardon Attorney which, in 
consultation with the attorney general, prepares and submits the department’s 
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the deputy attorney general, the line for privileged advice was 
drawn between the President and the deputy attorney general in 
this case, not between the President and the pardon attorney.  
Therefore, while the pardon attorney functionally contributes to 
the advice ultimately offered to the President, it is the 
organizational structure of the Office of the President that 
defines the boundary of the presidential-communications 
privilege.  The court held that if the privilege is interpreted to 
encompass all those who functionally give advice to the 
President on his Article II powers, the rule “would sweep within 
the reach of the presidential privilege much of the functions of 
the executive branch.”128  In adopting an organizational test and 
retaining the “solicited and received” language from Espy, the 
court noted that direct communications between the pardon 
attorney or the deputy and White House counsel or other 
immediate presidential advisers would still be protected, as 
would any documents, reports, or recommendations submitted 
by the deputy to the Office of the President.129 
Finally, it is important to note for the analysis in Part IV that 
the appeals court in Judicial Watch refused to draw a line 
demarking the boundary of the executive privilege at the 
President’s Article II powers.  Reasoning that such a line would 
be arbitrary, the court found that “presidential decisions that 
could have been delegated, but were not, [should not be] entitled 
to less candid or confidential advice than those that could not 
have been delegated at all.”130  Therefore, under Judicial Watch, 
executive privilege is available to protect information in a 
President’s exercise of powers reserved to him both by the 
Constitution and by statute.  Writing in dissent, Judge Randolph 
argued that the privilege should extend beyond those 
“quintessential and nondelegable Presidential power[s]” set 
forth in Article II.131  Furthermore, a functional test is 
appropriate to determine whether the privilege applies to 
documents created by agency officials, regardless of the author’s 
“operational proximity” to the President, and regardless of 
 
recommendation to the President for final review and disposition.  See generally 
http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon (last visited Nov. 21, 2008). 
128 Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1122. 
129 See id. at 1123–24. 
130 Id. at 1123. 
131 Id. at 1139 (Randolph, J., dissenting). 
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whether those documents were actually “solicited and received” 
by the White House.132  According to Judge Randolph, the 
privilege should apply to anyone, in any agency, at any level who 
assists in providing advice to the President in his fulfillment of an 
Article II power. 
D.  Cases Arising from Subpoenas in Congressional 
Investigations 
Executive-legislative disputes represent the last of the four 
contexts in which executive-privilege claims have been litigated.  
In Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,133 
the Supreme Court recognized the unique nature of interbranch 
information disputes, saying “[o]nce executive privilege is 
asserted, coequal branches . . . are set on a collision course”; for 
that reason, “occasion[s] for constitutional confrontation 
between the two branches should be avoided whenever 
possible.”134  Indeed, this view has been pervasive in interbranch 
disputes since the conclusion of the Watergate cases and 
Archibald Cox’s seminal publication on executive privilege in 
1974.135  In that article, Cox asserted that such disputes “lend[] 
[themselves] better to solutions negotiated through the political 
process than to an ‘either-or’ judicial determination.”136  The 
best possible balance of constitutional powers will result by 
“leav[ing] questions of executive privilege vis-à-vis Congress to 
the ebb and flow of political power.”137  As a result, courts have 
both explicitly and implicitly kept claims of executive privilege in 
interbranch disputes at arm’s length: explicitly in Nixon I and 
Espy, and implicitly in Nixon II and Judicial Watch. 
In 1974, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional basis 
for executive privilege.  In Nixon I, the Court noted in plain 
terms that its holding did not reach “the balance between the 
President’s generalized interest in confidentiality . . . and 
 
132 Id. at 1138 (emphasis omitted). 
133 542 U.S. 385 (2004). 
134 Id. at 389–90 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
135 See generally Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 
(1974). 
136 Id. at 1427. 
137 Id. at 1432. 
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congressional demands for information.”138  Twenty-three years 
later the D.C. Circuit explained that its decision in Espy was 
similarly “limited to the context . . . where information 
generated by close presidential advisers is sought for use in a 
judicial proceeding,” and that its decision “should not be read as 
in any way affecting the scope of the privilege in the 
congressional-executive context.”139 
Neither Nixon II nor Judicial Watch explicitly states that its 
holding cannot apply to interbranch disputes.  However, 
subsequent treatment of Nixon II and Espy (on which Judicial 
Watch so heavily relies) suggests that courts may not be willing 
to look to those cases for precedent in disputes between the 
President and Congress.  For example, Nixon II was not cited by 
the D.C. Circuit in United States v. House of Representatives,140 
nor was it cited by the district court in Walker v. Cheney,141 the 
only interbranch disputes to be litigated since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Nixon I.  Similarly, Espy was not cited by the 
district court in Walker v. Cheney, the only interbranch dispute 
litigated since 1997. 
Because both United States v. House of Representatives and 
Walker v. Cheney were dismissed on procedural grounds, it 
might be too much to say that Nixon II and Judicial Watch do 
not limit the scope of the privilege in executive-legislative 
disputes.  However, the quoted excerpts from Nixon I and Espy 
clearly articulate that no burden can be placed upon the political 
branches by the courts’ decisions in the context of criminal 
investigations.  Based on that language and the courts’ refusal to 
cite Espy and Nixon II in subsequent litigation of interbranch 
disputes, only those decisions reported in cases between the 
political branches should bear on the scope of executive 
privilege. 
Not only have the courts explicitly and implicitly stated that 
holdings from other contexts should not circumscribe the scope 
of executive privilege in interbranch disputes, the courts have 
refused to draw a line between Article I and Article II powers in 
the three cases that have reached the courts.  In fact, these cases 
 
138 Nixon I, 418 U.S. 683, 712 n.19 (1974). 
139 Espy, 121 F.3d 729, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
140 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983); see also infra Part IV.D.3. 
141 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002). 
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support the notion that the district court and the D.C. Circuit 
“have effectively supplanted the traditional legal method [of 
adjudicating interbranch disputes] with an unorthodox 
approach.”142  This approach, aptly dubbed the “escalation 
model,”143 favors an “escalating process of mutual evaluation 
and response [that ends only] when one branch concludes that 
the continued expenditure of political capital does not justify the 
institutional benefits of victory.”144  By subscribing to the 
premise that “litigation followed by judicial decree” is “poison” 
in a system carefully calibrated on “political battle[s] followed by 
. . . calculated surrender[s],”145 the courts have institutionalized 
political brinksmanship and relied upon it to refrain from 
adjudicating the separation of powers question inherent in 
executive-legislative disputes. 
The leeway courts have given the political branches to resolve 
these disputes is in stark contrast to the intricate analysis laid out 
by the D.C. Circuit in Espy and Judicial Watch for resolving 
executive-privilege claims in criminal proceedings and FOIA 
litigation.  However, the current dispute is unique.  As 
highlighted in the discussion of United States v. House of 
Representatives below, by holding Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten in 
contempt, the House of Representatives initiated a suit that is in 
the exact procedural posture the district court described as 
necessary for judicial review of an interbranch executive-
privilege question.  As a result, the courts may finally be forced 
to circumscribe the privilege in that context. 
1.  Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 
v. Nixon 
Although the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Senate Select 
Committee146 preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon I, 
the court’s holding is salient for two reasons.  First, it provides 
the most comprehensive analysis of the need that a 
congressional committee must show to overcome the 
 
142 O’Neil, supra note 7, at 1088. 
143 Id. at 1085. 
144 Id. at 1084. 
145 Id. at 1085. 
146 Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 
725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
MARRIOTT.FMT 12/8/2008  11:09:03 AM 
2008] A Four-Step Inquiry to Guide Judicial Review 289 
presumptive nature of an executive-privilege claim.  Because the 
Supreme Court’s discussion of the special prosecutor’s showing 
of need in Nixon I does not apply to interbranch disputes,147 the 
discussion of requisite need in Senate Select Committee still 
controls in the D.C. Circuit.  Second, Senate Select Committee is 
the only executive-privilege case in any context to be decided on 
the merits.  While the court’s holding was narrowly focused, it 
provides a good foundation for analyzing subsequent 
interbranch disputes. 
The Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities was created by a resolution of the Senate in 1973 to 
“investigate illegal, improper or unethical activities” connected 
to the presidential campaign and election of 1972 and to 
determine whether new legislation was needed to protect the 
integrity of the electoral process.148  Pursuant to its charge, the 
committee subpoenaed President Nixon to obtain tape 
recordings and other records that related to alleged criminal acts 
tied to the election.149  President Nixon refused to comply, 
asserting executive privilege to justify his decision.150 
Basing its decision on the “staged decisional structure” set out 
in Sirica,151 the court found that events subsequent to the district 
court’s ruling, including the commencement of a House 
Judiciary Committee inquiry and that committee’s possession of 
the tapes at issue, had changed the circumstances surrounding 
the Select Committee’s original complaint.152  According to the 
court, the Select Committee “failed to make the requisite 
showing” that “the subpoenaed evidence [was] demonstrably 
critical to the responsible fulfillment of [its] functions.”153  In 
reaching this conclusion, the appeals court made two notable 
findings. 
 
147 Nixon I, 418 U.S. 683, 712 n.19 (1974). 
148 Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 726 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
149 Id. at 726–27. 
150 Id. at 727. 
151 Id. at 730. 
152 See id. at 731–32. 
153 Id. at 731.  Because the appeals court explicitly invoked the “staged decisional 
structure” of Sirica, it is reasonable to infer that the “demonstrably critical” 
language used to describe the committee’s requisite showing of need is intended to 
expound on the Sirica court’s vague reference to the Special Prosecutor’s “uniquely 
powerful showing.”  See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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First, from a congressional perspective, the Select 
Committee’s oversight need was “merely cumulative” because 
(1) that need was “premised solely on an asserted power to 
investigate and inform,” (2) the House Judiciary Committee had 
the subpoenaed materials in its possession, and (3) “there [was] 
no indication that the findings of [the Judiciary Committee] and, 
eventually, the House of Representatives itself, [were] likely to 
be inconclusive or long in coming.”154  Second, the Select 
Committee did not prove that the subpoenaed documents were 
“critical to the performance of its legislative functions” because 
events subsequent to its complaint undermined the argument 
that the legislative process required access to a “precise 
reconstruction of past events” as might be found on the tapes.155  
Thus, in the particular circumstances before the court, the Select 
Committee’s claim of need was “too attenuated and too 
tangential to its functions to permit a judicial judgment that the 
President is required to comply with the [c]ommittee’s 
subpoena.”156 
2.  United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 
In the first post-Watergate case, the D.C. Circuit feigned 
resolution of a dispute between the Department of Justice and 
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and set forth 
its reasoning in favor of the escalation model.  With a mandate 
to examine the nature and extent of the Justice Department’s 
domestic warrantless-wiretapping program and to determine 
whether a need for remedial legislation to prevent abuse of the 
power existed, the subcommittee subpoenaed AT&T to obtain 
national security request letters regarding the company’s 
involvement in the program.157  In an effort to preclude the 
subcommittee’s efforts, the Justice Department sued to enjoin 
AT&T from complying with the subpoenas, and the House of 
Representatives intervened.158  Approaching the issue for a 
 
154 Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 732–33. 
155 Id. at 732. 
156 Id. at 733. 
157 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
158 Id. at 122–24. 
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second time,159 the D.C. Circuit was asked to overturn a district 
court injunction that prevented release of the documents.160  
While the appeals court recognized that judicial review was 
proper, its adopted role resembled that of a mediator rather than 
an arbiter of disputes. 
The court invalidated each branch’s absolute claim to the 
information requested.161  However, it was unwilling to balance 
Congress’s demand for information against a claim of executive 
privilege, choosing instead to continue its “approach of 
gradualism,” allowing the two branches to try again in good faith 
to resolve the dispute on their own.162  The court saw the 
political battle as “a dynamic process affirmatively furthering the 
constitutional scheme,” and believed that the judiciary’s role was 
to reach a “judgment that reflect[ed] the compromises achieved 
through negotiation.”163  To that end, it sustained the district 
court’s injunction until the parties showed that a subsequent 
attempt at mutual accommodation also failed.164 
3.  United States v. House of Representatives 
Six years after AT&T, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia mirrored the D.C. Circuit’s reluctance to resolve an 
interbranch executive-privilege dispute when it dismissed United 
States v. House of Representatives on procedural grounds.165  In a 
situation strikingly similar to that presented by the firing of the 
nine U.S. Attorneys, the Oversight and Investigations 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Public Works and 
Transportation subpoenaed the Administrator of the 
 
159 The first time the case was before the D.C. Circuit, the court refrained from 
deciding the merits of the parties’ claims, resolved the issue of whether the case 
presented a nonjusticiable political question, and remanded the record to the 
district court with directions to negotiate a settlement.  See id. at 123. 
160 See id. at 122–23. 
161 See id. at 128 (“The executive would have it that the Constitution confers on 
the executive absolute discretion in the area of national security.  This does not 
stand up.”); id. at 129 (“[T]he [Speech and Debate] Clause does not and was not 
intended to immunize congressional investigatory actions from judicial review.  
Congress’ [sic] investigatory power is not, itself, absolute.”). 
162 Id. at 131. 
163 Id. at 130. 
164 See id. at 133. 
165 See United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D.D.C. 
1983). 
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Environmental Protection Agency for documents pertaining to 
the agency’s enforcement of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980.166  In a 
hearing before the subcommittee, Administrator Gorsuch stated 
that President Reagan asserted executive privilege and that she 
was instructed not to provide the subcommittee with any 
“sensitive documents found in open law enforcement files.”167  
Following Ms. Gorsuch’s testimony, the committee reported the 
incident to the full House of Representatives in a resolution.  
The House cited Ms. Gorsuch with contempt of Congress less 
than a week later.168  She was the first head of an executive 
agency to be held in contempt of Congress. 
On the same day Ms. Gorsuch was found in contempt, the 
Justice Department filed suit against the House of 
Representatives in district court to preempt the chain of events 
set in motion by the contempt citation pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 
194.  According to the statute, the Speaker of the House “shall” 
certify the statement of facts concerning the contempt citation to 
the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, “whose duty it 
shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its 
action.”169  The Justice Department sought a declaratory 
judgment stating whether the Administrator acted lawfully in 
withholding the documents under the President’s claim of 
executive privilege.170 
The court dismissed the case on procedural grounds, noting 
that under the provisions of 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 and 194 
“constitutional claims and other objections to congressional 
investigatory procedures may be raised as defenses in a criminal 
prosecution.”171  The court noted that the Justice Department 
was permitted to invoke executive privilege as a plaintiff-
intervener in AT&T because it would not have been a defendant 
in criminal contempt charges brought by Congress against 
AT&T to compel production of the documents.172  In House of 
 
166 Id. at 151. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 2 U.S.C. § 194 (2006). 
170 House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. at 152. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
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Representatives, however, the court found that the Justice 
Department raised its “executive privilege defense as the basis 
for affirmative relief” and held that “[j]udicial resolution of this 
constitutional claim . . . will never become necessary unless 
Administrator Gorsuch becomes a defendant in either a criminal 
contempt proceeding or other legal action taken by Congress.”173 
The court made two important observations by holding that a 
claim of executive privilege in a direct dispute between Congress 
and the executive must be asserted as an affirmative defense.  
First, the district court noted that it would be “required to 
resolve the dispute by determining the validity of the 
[a]dministrator’s claim of executive privilege” if the two 
branches failed to resolve the matter through the political 
process.174  Second, the court recognized “[t]he difficulties 
apparent in prosecuting Administrator Gorsuch for contempt of 
Congress” and encouraged the parties to “settle their differences 
without further judicial involvement.”175 
The facts surrounding the U.S. Attorneys’ resignations 
illustrate the district court’s discussion.  The letters exchanged by 
the parties clearly indicate that the House Judiciary Committee 
and the White House have not yet been able to resolve the 
matter through the political process, prompting the House of 
Representatives to find Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten in contempt of 
Congress.  Although Attorney General Mukasey refused to 
initiate a grand jury investigation,176 the district court in the 
Judiciary Committee’s civil suit against Ms. Miers and Mr. 
Bolten177 is still bound by the language in United States v. House 
of Representatives.  The complaint brings the political branches 
into precisely the procedural posture described by the district 
court as proper for adjudication of an executive-privilege claim. 
 
173 Id. at 153. 
174 Id. at 152. 
175 Id. at 153. 
176 Dan Eggen, Mukasey Refuses to Prosecute Bush Aides, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 
2008, at A2. 
177 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 4. 
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III 
PROPRIETY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE 
DISPUTES 
Judicial review of executive-privilege claims in interbranch 
disputes is proper for both ideological and practical reasons.  
First, judicial review is appropriate to prevent an imbalance in 
the separation of powers.  Second, judicial review is proper 
because the Supreme Court has asserted itself as the fulcrum 
between the political branches. 
As Part II.D, supra, demonstrated, federal courts have been 
reluctant to embroil themselves in this constitutional separation 
of powers question.  The idea that the judiciary should “leave 
questions of executive privilege vis-à-vis Congress to the ebb and 
flow of political power”178 has settled with both judges and 
scholars who agree that executive-legislative disputes lend 
themselves “better to solutions negotiated through the political 
process than to an ‘either-or’ judicial determination.”179  Such a 
regime correctly recognizes executive-privilege questions as 
“political” constitutional questions but incorrectly distinguishes 
the courts’ responsibility to intervene and address them.  A 
President’s decision to assert executive privilege is a choice to 
expend political capital regardless of whom the President is 
asserting the privilege against.  In Nixon I, the Supreme Court 
held that the President’s claim of executive privilege could not 
impair the judiciary’s proper constitutional mandate to decide 
cases and controversies under Article III.  To resolve the two 
branches’ competing interests “in a manner that preserve[d] the 
essential functions of each branch,”180 the Court adopted a 
balancing test that pitted the “President’s acknowledged need 
for confidentiality” against the judiciary’s “constitutional need” 
for evidence in criminal proceedings.181  Since the Supreme 
Court reached a decision on the merits when Article III powers 
were in jeopardy, federal courts can, and should, similarly 
address the merits of executive-privilege disputes between 
Congress and the executive when Article II powers are 
 
178 Cox, supra note 135, at 1432. 
179 Id. at 1427. 
180 Nixon I, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974). 
181 Id. at 712–13. 
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threatened and Congress demonstrates a “constitutional need” 
for the information in question.182 
While the Court in Nixon I justified the judiciary’s 
involvement in disputes between the courts and the executive, 
the judiciary cannot avoid involving itself in disputes between 
Congress and the executive just because the parties are political 
by nature.  Courts cannot refuse to decide an executive-privilege 
claim asserted against Congress on the merits simply because the 
President and Congress are political branches of the federal 
government.  True inequity arises when the courts do not reach 
executive-privilege claims asserted against Congress but 
repeatedly reach those claims when they are asserted in criminal 
proceedings–a context that implicates the courts’ powers under 
Article III.  By reviewing privilege claims in the latter but not 
the former, the courts imply that executive privilege has more 
weight when asserted against Congress than it does in other 
contexts.  If the courts refuse to settle disputes between the 
political branches where negotiations have obviously broken 
down, the door is left wide open for an expansion of executive 
privilege not consistent with a balance of equal but separate 
powers.  The President who invokes the privilege will always 
have the upper hand in negotiations, even when the issue 
involves potential wrongdoing by a member of the executive 
branch.  If “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is,”183 then the courts 
must step in where the two political branches have been unable 
to resolve an executive-privilege dispute. 
Even scholars who argue that claims of constitutional 
executive privilege have no place in federal court recognize that 
extreme cases may deserve judicial scrutiny.184  The definition of 
“extreme cases,” however, should not be a narrow one.  Rather, 
 
182 By way of corollary, federal courts should properly adjudicate disputes 
between the executive and Congress when, in the face of an assertion of privilege 
under the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, the executive 
demonstrates a “constitutional need” for information sought from a member of 
Congress, her staff, a committee, or committee staff. 
183 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
184 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency 
After Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1378 (1999) (“[O]utside of 
extreme cases, a claim of constitutional executive privilege should have no status in 
the courts, and should supply no defense to an otherwise appropriate judicial 
subpoena, summons, or other order.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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“extreme cases” should include all actions taken by one coequal 
branch to thwart the efforts of another exercising its 
constitutional role. 
Recent scholarship has begun to question the soundness of 
the escalation model alluded to in 1974185 but only defined 
recently.186  Courts must play a substantive role in interbranch 
conflicts over information because “[t]here is no reason to 
believe–and, in fact, powerful reason to doubt–that the 
political process alone will yield a satisfactory allocation of 
authority in this context.”187  The three premises that bolster the 
escalation model188 have been dismissed because the model 
“recognizes the ‘legal’ rather than political character of the issue, 
but it rejects the traditional legal mode of resolution, instead 
equating the correct constitutional standard with the point at 
which the power balance rests when the smoke of battle 
clears.”189 
Not only is the judicial abdication embodied in the escalation 
model inconsistent with the goal of achieving a proper balance of 
powers, it is also inconsistent with the position the Supreme 
Court took in Nixon II.  The Court in Nixon II inserted itself as 
the “fulcrum between executive and legislative power.”190  When 
a statute potentially infringes on executive power, the Court held 
that it must determine whether Congress’s power to legislate 
overrides the executive’s power to carry out its assigned 
functions.191  While the firing of the nine U.S. Attorneys 
represents a role reversal in the assertion of the privilege from 
Nixon II, the courts’ role remains the same.  Rather than 
forsaking their responsibility in favor of escalation, federal 
courts should conduct a four-step inquiry to determine the 
merits of the privilege claim; such an inquiry was implied in the 
language of Nixon II and is proposed formally in Part IV.C, 
infra. 
 
185 See Cox, supra note 135, at 1432. 
186 See O’Neil, supra note 7, at 1085. 
187 Id. at 1083. 
188 See id. at 1085–87. 
189 Id. at 1095 (footnote omitted). 
190 Id. at 1105. 
191 See Nixon II, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). 
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IV 
A FOUR-STEP INQUIRY TO GUIDE RESOLUTION OF 
EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE DISPUTES 
The political branches need as much flexibility as possible to 
resolve information disputes outside of the courts.  As the 
current controversy demonstrates, however, resolution through 
accommodation is not always possible.  In such cases, the courts 
must have a method for resolving disputes that can be applied 
consistently and does not unduly constrain future negotiations.  
This Part points out the danger of applying existing case law to 
disputes between the political branches and suggests a four-step 
inquiry to guide courts in resolving interbranch disputes and to 
serve as the foundation for a common law of executive privilege 
in that context. 
A.  The Problem with Applying Existing Case Law to Executive-
Legislative Disputes 
Applying existing case law to executive-legislative disputes is 
problematic because the cases do not adequately prepare the 
courts to deal with the political constitutional questions that are 
raised when negotiations break down.  Part II.D, supra, showed 
that the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have explicitly and 
implicitly exempted conflicts between the political branches 
from the analyses set out for executive privilege in criminal 
proceedings and FOIA litigation.  The courts have sought to 
avoid suggesting that they would apply either analysis to decide 
an executive-legislative dispute so that Congress and the 
President would not be artificially constrained in future 
interactions.  Even though the courts have not wanted the 
political branches to use those decisions to guide future 
negotiations, judges will want to reference them when an 
executive-legislative dispute is properly before the courts 
because these decisions represent the body of executive-
privilege case law.  But therein lies the problem.  The Supreme 
Court’s balancing test in Nixon I and the D.C. Circuit’s analysis 
of need in Senate Select Committee may be useful to the district 
court in the current controversy.  However, the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in Judicial Watch not to limit the privilege to powers 
assigned to the President in Article II is problematic because it 
MARRIOTT.FMT 12/8/2008  11:09:03 AM 
298 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 259 
does not respect the unique balance of power issues presented in 
executive-legislative disputes.192 
In determining the scope of the privilege in the context of a 
FOIA request, Judicial Watch held that limiting the protection of 
the privilege to quintessential and nondelegable powers under 
Article II would unnecessarily exclude powers assigned to the 
President by statute that may otherwise be delegated.193  
However, denying privilege protection to documents and 
testimony produced pursuant to statutory powers does not draw 
an “arbitrary line” in conflicts between the political branches.  
The proper balance of power is disrupted when an act by one 
branch encroaches upon the “constitutionally assigned 
functions” and “constitutional authority” of a coordinate 
branch.194  A President may be able to assert the same level of 
privilege protection over documents and testimony related to 
both constitutionally assigned and statutorily granted powers in 
the face of a citizen’s challenge under FOIA.  However, a 
President should not be granted the same level of privilege 
protection when Congress subpoenas documents and testimony 
pursuant to its constitutionally assigned powers.  In contrast, the 
delicate constitutional balance of power is not questioned when 
the President invokes executive privilege to protect documents 
against a FOIA claim.  While the majority’s rebuff of Judge 
 
192 The two central holdings of Judicial Watch may, however, be of some use.  
The appeals court upheld the “solicited and received” language of Espy in the 
FOIA context and held that the boundaries of executive privilege should be defined 
by the organizational structure of the Office of the President.  See Judicial Watch, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1114, 1122–23 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  Both of these 
holdings may have equivalent weight in the context of executive-legislative disputes 
insofar as they limit whose documents may be considered under the privilege.  In 
other words, these holdings may be applied by a court analyzing an executive-
privilege claim in any context, including cases arising from subpoenas in 
congressional investigations, because the holdings contemplate the genesis of the 
information in question and the proximity of an official to the President.  The 
holdings do not, however, contemplate the subject matter of the communications–
the critical consideration in conflicts between the executive and Congress, each of 
which was assigned specific powers under the Constitution. 
193 See id. at 1123 (“[T]he dissent’s qualification that the protection of the 
presidential communications privilege would attach only if the advice is on a 
quintessential and nondelegable [p]residential power . . . draws an arbitrary line, for 
it provides no reason to conclude that presidential decisions that could have been 
delegated, but were not, are entitled to less candid or confidential advice than those 
that could not have been delegated at all.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
194 Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 443. 
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Randolph’s dissenting opinion in Judicial Watch may be upheld 
in that context,195 the majority’s interpretation of the scope of 
the privilege cannot be adopted to resolve interbranch disputes. 
In executive-legislative disputes, as opposed to FOIA 
litigation, Congress’s powers under Article I are in conflict with 
the President’s powers under Article II.  If Congress must show 
a need that is “demonstrably critical” to fulfilling its “legislative 
functions” in order to overcome the presumption of privilege196 
(clearly limiting the scope of its need to Article I), then the 
President should not be able to extend the presumption beyond 
the powers assigned to him in Article II.  Allowing the President 
to assert executive privilege over documents and testimony 
related to powers granted by statute, rather than assigned by the 
Constitution, would shift the balance of power in favor of the 
executive unless the need to be shown by Congress was reduced 
below the “demonstrably critical” threshold. 
B.  Two Premises Underlying the Four-Step Inquiry 
Derived from the Supreme Court’s language in Nixon II and 
both supplemented and supported by the D.C. Circuit’s narrow 
holding in Senate Select Committee, the four-step inquiry 
described in Part IV.C, infra, sets parameters for resolving 
interbranch disputes and provides the branches maximum 
flexibility in future negotiations.  The inquiry is based on two 
general premises: (1) a balancing test is inevitable for judicial 
resolution of executive-privilege claims in interbranch disputes; 
and (2) a common law of executive privilege, not bright-line 
rules or intricate analytical structures, will provide the political 
branches the most flexibility in future negotiations. 
1.  A Balancing Test Is Inevitable 
While the balancing test set forth in Nixon I has been 
criticized as inappropriate for determining the scope of a 
constitutionally based privilege,197 a balancing test is inevitable 
 
195 Cf. Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1123.  See supra Part II.C for discussion. 
196 Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 
725, 731, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
197 See Paulsen, supra note 184, at 1341 (The scope of executive privilege “is not 
left to an ad hoc judicially-created constitutional balancing test exclusively the 
province of the courts, as [Nixon I] held, and certainly not to the poorly-designed 
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when the political branches cannot define the boundaries of 
executive privilege themselves.198  The Court in Nixon I made 
clear that its holding does not apply to interbranch disputes,199 
but a balancing test in that context is sound in principle 
nonetheless.  The fact that the parties reach litigation over a 
privilege that the Supreme Court has said unequivocally is not 
absolute demands that a balancing take place.  However, when 
to balance and what to balance are separate questions.  The first 
is a question of scope.  The second is a question of defining 
interests.  The first three questions of the four-step inquiry laid 
out in Part IV.C, infra, dictate when the courts should balance 
Congress’s and the President’s interests.  The fourth question 
discusses what interests must be balanced. 
2.  A Common Law of Executive Privilege Is Preferable 
A common law of executive privilege in interbranch disputes 
is preferable to bright-line rules or judicial abdication because it 
is the only way to resolve the tension between the political 
branches’ need for flexibility and a proper balance of powers.  
Bright-line rules are easy to use, but they comport with neither 
the give-and-take nature of the political process nor the nature 
and principles of executive privilege.200  Moreover, because the 
Constitution establishes three coequal branches, the judiciary 
cannot implement bright-line rules to broadly define the limits of 
executive privilege between Congress and the President.  If the 
 
balance the Court constructed in [Nixon I].  The Constitution simply does not 
authorize creation of a mushy judicial balancing test for determining the scope of 
constitutionally-based executive privilege.”) (emphasis omitted). 
198 In fact, it would be against the interest of the political branches to define the 
limits of the privilege on their own.  Both Congress and the President benefit from 
the maximum flexibility they are granted under the current state of the law, and the 
current state of the law in executive-legislative disputes is that there are no rules.  
Since the courts have expressly precluded application of their holdings in Nixon I 
and Espy to disputes between the political branches, the parties are operating in a 
framework where the only general understanding is that a President’s claim of 
executive privilege is not absolute.  Therefore, if the political branches were to 
voluntarily limit the scope of the privilege as between them, they would be 
conceding their own perceived power under the Constitution. 
199 Nixon I, 418 U.S. 683, 712 n.19 (1974). 
200 See Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1117. 
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courts did so, they would overstep their own constitutional 
authority by dictating the powers of a coordinate branch.201 
A common law of executive privilege that takes into account 
“constitutional concerns, as well as accommodate[s] the view of 
the judiciary to the view of the executive,”202 must also 
accommodate the view of the executive to the view of the 
legislature in disputes between the political branches.  This 
three-way balancing act is unique to litigation involving both 
political branches, and successfully developing a common law of 
the privilege depends on respecting the distinct roles of each 
branch.  Executive-privilege disputes in the contexts of FOIA 
requests and criminal proceedings do not pose the same 
balancing problems because the court is not required to 
simultaneously equilibrate the interests of both parties in 
litigation with its own dual role as arbiter and coequal branch.  If 
the courts established bright-line rules to govern interbranch 
disputes, they would effectively tip the balance of power in favor 
of the judiciary while simultaneously frustrating the process of 
accommodation favored by Congress and the executive.  
Alternatively, if the courts abdicated their role as arbiter, the 
balance of power would tip in favor of the executive because 
there would be no check on a President who used the privilege 
to expand executive power. 
Providing for a common law in interbranch disputes thus 
requires a set of threshold questions to guide intensive, fact-
based inquiries.  These threshold questions should not forecast 
the outcome of a particular dispute when answered; such 
outcome-determinative questions would preempt the judicial 
discretion necessary for establishing a common law of the 
privilege.  Rather, as the four-step inquiry set out below 
demonstrates, the threshold questions should articulate the 
scope of the privilege between Congress and the President and 
narrow the courts’ scope of review to minimize the impact their 
decisions have on future negotiations and litigation. 
 
201 Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 703 (“In the performance of assigned constitutional duties 
each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the 
interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others.”). 
202 Paulsen, supra note 184, at 1379. 
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C.  The Four-Step Inquiry 
The four-step inquiry set forth herein is derived from the 
Supreme Court’s language in Nixon II and is both supplemented 
and supported by the D.C. Circuit’s narrow holding in Senate 
Select Committee.203  In Nixon II, the Court laid out the 
conditions precedent to a judicial balancing of the President’s 
desire for secrecy and Congress’s power to legislate and conduct 
investigations: only where an act of one political branch may 
potentially disrupt the constitutionally assigned functions of the 
other must the courts determine whether the “impact is justified 
by an overriding need to promote objectives within the 
constitutional authority” of the first branch.204  Therefore, in the 
context of a President’s claim of executive privilege against 
Congress, the inquiry includes four questions: (1) Does the act of 
withholding documents or testimony under a claim of executive 
privilege have the potential to disrupt the constitutionally 
assigned functions of Congress?; (2) Has Congress established a 
valid constitutional need for each piece of information or 
testimony requested?; (3) Does the dispute concern testimony or 
documents created pursuant to a power assigned to the 
executive under Article II?; and (4) Does the President’s need 
for secrecy in deliberations regarding the Article II power in 
question outweigh Congress’s established constitutional need? 
 
203 The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Senate Select Committee, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 
1974), is the only executive-privilege case brought in any court that was decided on 
the merits. 
204 Nixon II, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).  To help understand the motive for such an 
inquiry, recall the Supreme Court’s commentary on the clash between the judiciary 
and the President in Nixon I: 
To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute 
privilege as against . . . enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a 
generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary 
and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of “a 
workable government” and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. 
III. 
Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 707.  Whether or not the current controversy implicates a 
power reserved to the President in Article II, it calls into question the President’s 
assertion of privilege against Congress’s legislative authority on no more than a 
generalized need for secrecy in nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions.  
Therefore, the constitutional balance of a workable government demands that the 
court conduct an inquiry into whether the privilege was properly asserted against 
Congress. 
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1.  The Potential to Disrupt Requirement 
Whether the privilege claim has the potential to disrupt the 
constitutionally assigned functions of Congress should be 
addressed as a pleading requirement.  Whether Congress has 
asserted a short and plain statement to satisfy the requirement 
should be an easy question to answer; the bar is low.  At the 
point where the parties are in litigation over the release of 
documents, both will likely have asserted claims to the 
information based on the powers vested in them by the 
Constitution.  In the current controversy, Congress has alleged 
that the President’s invocation of executive privilege encroaches 
on its Article I powers to conduct oversight and propose 
legislation,205 while the President has alleged that Congress’s 
demand for information encroaches on his appointment and 
removal power under Article II.206  Whether the President 
actually disrupts a constitutionally assigned function of Congress 
is the ultimate constitutional question to be addressed by the 
balancing test proposed in question (4) below.  Therefore, 
judicial evaluation of actual disruption becomes the fundamental 
basis for the common law of executive privilege.  In this first 
step, the burden rests with Congress to show the potential for 
disruption, and the complaint filed by Congress on March 10, 
2008, easily meets this minimum threshold requirement.207 
 
205 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 4, at 10 (“The 
legislative purposes of the Investigation fall into two main categories: (1) 
investigating and exposing malfeasance, abuse of authority and possible violations 
of law by Executive Branch personnel; and (2) considering whether the conduct 
uncovered warrants additions or modifications to existing federal law.”). 
206 See Fielding Letter, supra note 1, at 2 (“Presidents would not be able to fulfill 
their responsibilities if their advisors–on fear of being commanded to Capitol Hill 
to testify or having their documents produced to Congress–were reluctant to 
communicate openly and honestly in the course of rendering advice and reaching 
decisions.  These confidentiality interests are especially strong in situations like the 
present controversy, where the inquiry seeks information relating to the President’s 
powers to appoint and remove U.S. Attorneys–authority granted exclusively to the 
President by the Constitution.”).  See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The 
President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
[S]upreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments 
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but 
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they 
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments.”). 
207 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 4. 
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2.  The Valid Constitutional Need Requirement 
The second question, whether Congress has established a 
“constitutional need” for each document or type of information 
in dispute, reflects the fundamental, bright-line requirement that 
a balancing of constitutional powers requires each branch to 
assert valid constitutional authority.  For Congress, 
demonstrating a constitutional need depends on the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Article I.  Importantly, under McGrain 
v. Daugherty, the powers of Congress include “not only such 
powers as are expressly granted to [it] by the Constitution, but 
such auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to make 
the express powers effective,” including “the power of inquiry 
[and] process to enforce it.”208  Therefore, a constitutional need 
may be established by Congress operating in its investigatory 
capacity as long as the investigation is to determine whether 
remedial legislation is required.  However, partisan 
investigations launched as mere fact-finding missions do not pass 
muster.209 
The D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Senate Select Committee is 
helpful in determining whether Congress has established a 
constitutional need.  According to the appeals court, Congress 
may show a constitutional need for subpoenaed information if its 
need is “demonstrably critical” to fulfilling “its legislative 
functions”210 and is not “merely cumulative.”211  However, Senate 
 
208 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173, 174 (1927). 
209 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 382 
(2004) (acknowledging that the president is not above the law and saying that “the 
public interest requires that a coequal branch of [g]overnment afford [p]residential 
confidentiality the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of 
justice . . . and give recognition to the paramount necessity of protecting the 
[e]xecutive [b]ranch from vexatious litigation that might distract it from the 
energetic performance of its constitutional duties” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
210 Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 
725, 731, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  The Select Committee did not demonstrate that the 
subpoenaed documents were “critical to the performance of its legislative 
functions” because events subsequent to its complaint undermined any argument 
that the legislative process required access to a “precise reconstruction of past 
events” as might be found on the tapes.  Id. at 732. 
211 Id. at 732–33 (From a congressional perspective, the court determined that the 
Select Committee’s oversight need was “merely cumulative” because (1) that need 
was “premised solely on an asserted power to investigate and inform,” (2) the 
House Judiciary Committee had the subpoenaed materials in its possession, and (3) 
“there [was] no indication that the findings of [the Judiciary Committee] and, 
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Select Committee does not stand for the proposition that 
Congress’s interest is less compelling when a committee’s 
primary interest is investigation.212  As long as Congress can 
explain why each document requested is not “too attenuated and 
too tangential” to the legislative purpose asserted,213 it has 
demonstrated a constitutional need.  Because the weight of 
Congress’s need can only be understood relative to the 
President’s, the balancing of needs is reserved for Step (4) of the 
inquiry.  This balancing is coextensive with the court’s 
determination of whether the President’s privilege claim actually 
disrupts Congress’s ability to carry out its legislative function. 
In the current controversy, Congress has requested, and the 
White House has refused to produce, a privilege log indicating 
the subject of each document requested and the basis for the 
President’s privilege claim.214  Even if the White House does not 
have to produce a record of the documents withheld from 
Congress during the accommodation process, production of a 
record for the court during litigation would serve two purposes 
in this four-step inquiry.  First, relevant to Step (2), the court can 
use the privilege log to determine whether Congress has asserted 
 
eventually, the House of Representatives itself, [were] likely to be inconclusive or 
long in coming.”). 
212 See ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 4 (“The D.C. Circuit’s view in Senate Select 
Committee that the Watergate committee’s oversight need for the requested 
materials was ‘merely cumulative’ in light of the then concurrent impeachment 
inquiry, has been utilized by the [e]xecutive as the basis for arguing that the 
Congress’ [sic] interest in executive information is less compelling when a 
committee’s function is oversight than when it is considering specific legislative 
proposals.  This approach, however, arguably misreads the carefully circumscribed 
holding of the court, and would seem to construe too narrowly the scope of 
Congress’ [sic] investigatory powers.” (footnote omitted)). 
213 See Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 733 (“We conclude that the need 
demonstrated by the Select Committee in the peculiar circumstances of this case, 
including the subsequent and on-going investigation of the House Judiciary 
Committee, is too attenuated and too tangential to its functions to permit a judicial 
judgment that the President is required to comply with the [c]ommittee’s 
subpoena.”). 
214 See Letter from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, to Patrick Leahy, 
Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, 
H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 44, at 2 (“We are aware of no authority by 
which a congressional committee may ‘direct’ the [e]xecutive to undertake the task 
of creating and providing an extensive description of every document covered by an 
assertion of Executive Privilege.”).  This refusal is not consistent with the 
executive’s track record of producing privilege logs in association with deliberative 
process privilege claims, however. 
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a valid constitutional need for each.  This may be by in camera 
review.  Based on the legislative purpose asserted, the court can 
determine whether Congress’s need is too attenuated or too 
tangential to require release of particular documents.  Second, 
relevant to Step (4), infra, if Congress has asserted a valid 
constitutional need, a privilege log would provide the basis for 
the President’s privilege claim relative to each document.  Both 
the President’s basis for the privilege and Congress’s asserted 
right to the information are necessary for the courts to balance 
each party’s needs.  If the courts do not require a privilege log 
either before or after litigation commences, then the back-and-
forth of accommodation, and the courts’ responsibility to 
equilibrate the roles of the three coordinate branches, can be 
subverted by what Chairmen Conyers and Leahy called a 
“blanket” claim of privilege.215 
3.  The Article II Requirement 
The third question, whether the dispute concerns documents 
created by the President pursuant to Article II, is notably 
different from the D.C. Circuit’s position in Judicial Watch.  
However, the question is justifiable based on the nature of 
executive-legislative disputes as described in Part IV.A, supra.  If 
the President asserts the privilege pursuant to statutory authority 
outside those powers set out in Article II, and Congress has 
established a constitutional need under Article I, then the 
analysis should end here and Congress should be granted access 
to the documents and testimony.  On the other hand, if the 
President asserts the privilege pursuant to an enumerated power 
under Article II, and Congress has established a constitutional 
need under Article I, then the presumption of privilege discussed 
in Sirica and Nixon I should weigh in favor of the President. 
This Step of the inquiry strikes at the heart of executive 
privilege by suggesting that the scope of the privilege should be 
different in interbranch disputes than in other contexts.  This 
assertion can be inferred from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Nixon I.  The Nixon I Court held that while a “President’s 
acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of 
 
215 Letter from Patrick Leahy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
and John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Fred Fielding, 
Counsel to the President, supra note 41, at 1. 
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his office is general in nature,” the “constitutional need” for 
relevant evidence in a particular criminal trial is “specific and 
central to [its] fair adjudication.”216  The Court went on to hold 
that the judiciary’s constitutional need required release of the 
recordings withheld.  A constitutional need that can be asserted 
by a coordinate branch per se outweighs a President’s general 
need for confidentiality in communications with White House 
advisers when the President’s action is not taken pursuant to an 
enumerated power under Article II. 
In the current dispute, President Bush has asserted a privilege 
claim over documents and testimony related to his exercise of 
the appointment and removal power.217  In response, Congress 
has asserted a valid constitutional need for the release of some 
or all of the responsive documents withheld.  Normally the 
mutual accommodation process leads to a resolution of these 
conflicts.  By filing for declaratory and injunctive relief, however, 
the House Judiciary Committee has signaled that the 
accommodation process has broken down.  Because the 
President is withholding documents pursuant to an Article II 
power, the White House should not be required to produce the 
documents in question unless the court determines that 
Congress’s constitutional need outweighs the presumption of 
privilege in favor of the President.  That analysis is at the core of 
the balancing test set out in Step (4). 
4.  The Balancing Test 
Ultimately, the presumption of privilege can only be rebutted 
if the court’s analysis of the facts in light of the fourth question 
demonstrates that Congress’s established constitutional need 
outweighs the President’s need for secrecy.218  Borrowing 
language from Sirica, “the public interest in confidentiality must 
 
216 Nixon I, 418 U.S. 683, 712–13 (1974). 
217 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The president] shall nominate, and by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the [S]upreme Court, and all other Officers 
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, 
and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, 
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). 
218 Implicit in the presumption, however, is the idea that no communications are 
categorically off limits for consideration by the court, a necessary conclusion if the 
ultimate goal is preservation of a proper balance of power. 
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fail in the face of [a] uniquely powerful showing” made by 
Congress in support of disclosure.219  Such a uniquely powerful 
showing may be demonstrated if the President’s invocation of 
the privilege actually disrupts Congress’s ability to carry out its 
constitutionally assigned functions.  This is a heavy burden for 
Congress, and the courts must make intensive, fact-based 
inquiries to determine if the burden has been carried.  A 
balancing test framed in this way comports with what the limited 
case law suggests about resolving executive-legislative disputes 
and provides a foundation for a common law of the privilege. 
If the court holds that Congress’s need outweighs the 
presumption in favor of the President, the court must then 
interpret the need itself and determine how to meet it.  There 
are two options.  First, the court may liken Congress’s 
constitutional need to an empty pool, whereby each document 
released adds water, and the need is met once there is sufficient 
water to swim, even if the pool is not entirely full.  Releasing all 
of the responsive documents, therefore, would not be necessary 
for Congress to fulfill its constitutionally assigned function.  
Instead, judges would be required to assess the breadth and 
depth of the accommodation process that took place prior to the 
breakdown of negotiations and determine how many, and which, 
documents must be released.  This view favors the President, and 
the executive has repeatedly advocated for it in the current 
controversy.220 
Alternatively, the court may liken Congress’s constitutional 
need to an ice cube tray, whereby each document released fills 
one cube and the need is only met when the tray is full.  This 
interpretation represents a “winner-takes-all” approach that is 
constrained only by the court’s determinations in Step (2).  By 
limiting the scope of documents for which Congress has 
established a constitutional need in Step (2), the court would 
stem the tide of documents flowing from the White House.  
 
219 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
220 See Clement Letter, supra note 26, at 3 (“[A]ny legitimate oversight interest 
the Committees might have in internal White House communications about the 
proposal is sharply reduced by the thousands of documents and dozens of hours of 
interviews and testimony already provided to the Committees by the Department of 
Justice as part of its extraordinary effort at accommodation.”); Fielding Letter, 
supra note 1, at 2 (“[I]t remains unclear precisely how and why your Committees 
are unable to fulfill your legislative and oversight interests without the unfettered 
requests you have made in your subpoenas.”). 
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Unmitigated, this view favors Congress and decreases the 
President’s ability to abuse the privilege, or to shield critical, 
smoking-gun documents from a subpoena. 
Both interpretations of Congress’s constitutional need go to 
the rationale for the privilege: that protecting communications 
between the President and his close aides and advisers is in the 
public interest.221  However, preventing unwarranted expansion 
of executive power by judicial validation of legislative oversight 
is also in the public interest.  Where Congress provides sufficient 
evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of the President, 




Weighing the public interest in secrecy against the public 
interest in disclosure of executive communications is an 
unwelcome task for courts when the balancing involves the 
political branches.  For that reason, “occasions for constitutional 
confrontation between the two branches should be avoided 
whenever possible.”222  However, when the accommodation 
process breaks down and Congress resorts to litigation, the 
courts cannot abdicate their responsibility to determine the 
limits of executive privilege as between the parties.  While 
existing case law provides little guidance for evaluating the 
balance of power issues inherent in interbranch disputes, it does 
suggest some guiding principles.  First, the nature of executive 
privilege favors intensive, fact-based inquiries.  These inquiries 
should lead to narrow decisions that minimize the impact on 
future negotiations between the political branches.  Second, 
balancing the valid constitutional needs in interbranch disputes 
is unique.  Neither criminal proceedings nor FOIA claims 
require a court to equilibrate three competing coequal powers: 
Congress’s legislative power under Article I, the executive’s 
power to carry out its assigned functions under Article II, and 
the judiciary’s power to decide cases and controversies under 
Article III.  To effectively balance these competing interests, the 
 
221 Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 705. 
222 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 365, 389–90 
(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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courts should restrict the scope of executive privilege to the 
President’s Article II powers when it is asserted against 
Congress and carefully fashion their decisions to preserve the 
political branches’ freedom to negotiate. 
 
 
